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 The Impact of the Institutions on Regional Unemployment Disparities in 
Europe 
 





The main aim of this paper is to study European regional disparities in unemployment, 
considering regional productive structures and some regional institutional variables. It is 
widely known that one most important stylized facts concerning the EU consists in 
regional disparities among regions. Such differences relate to both income per capita and 
the labour market, the latter generally measured in terms of unemployment rates. In a 
recent paper (Amendola, Caroleo Coppola, 2004) we have analysed the economic 
structure of the EU’s regions using proxies for the productive structure and the labour 
market. In this paper we estimate a panel data model where the dependent variable is the 
regional unemployment rate and the independent variables relate to the productive 
structure and some regional institutional aspects. The results confirm that institutional 
variables, such as the centralization of wage bargaining, the decentralization of public 
expenditure and the level of bureaucracy, have important impacts on unemployment rates. 
 




The problem of regional disparities is a crucial theme in the debate on the economic and 
political process of constructing the European Union. In fact, if we compare the United States 
with the European Union, we find that the convergence process is slower in the latter. 
Moreover, in the same period, disparities among regions have persisted or increased. It is 
possible to cite numerous examples of the persistence of regional disparities: the unsolved 
problem of German unification (Marani, 2004), the absence of growth recorded by many less-
developed regions in Mediterranean Europe (Caroleo and Destefanis 2005), and the slow 
transition of the East European countries (Perugini e Signorelli 2004). 
The implications in terms of economic theory and policy are of great significance. In fact, no 
growth theory developed so far, neither for instance the neoclassical theory nor the 
endogenous theory, nor the new economic geography, are able fully to explain the European 
case (European Commission 2000; De la Fuente 2000). As regards economic policy aspects, 
to be noted is that the EU’s cohesion policy has been unable to promote economic integration, 
although this is the prerequisite for the full operation of the European Union’s fiscal and 
monetary policy  (Boldrin and Canova 2001; Ederveen and Gorter 2002).  
There is almost unanimous agreement in the debate that the institutional and economic 
conditions regulating the labour market exert major effects on the convergence process. In 
fact, regional convergence is measured in terms of GDP per capita and/or in terms of the 
employment rate and productivity level. Econometric estimates confirm that the slow 
convergence process and the existence of clusters of homogenous regions – internally 
convergent but mutually divergent – in the EU is caused by employment rate dynamics 
(European Commission 2004; for a survey see Daniele 2002), and consequently by labour 
market characteristics. It is consequently important to study the institutional mechanisms that 
regulate the labour market, as well as the characteristics of labour demand and supply, and 
their dependence on spatial factors (Nienhur, 2000)   3
The basic idea of this study is that the regional and/or national disparities in Europe are 
caused not only by differences among productive structures and the technological and 
economic conditions that determine employment levels but also by differences among the 
institutional arrangements that regulate labour markets. In other words, we maintain that these 
factors may contribute to creating or sustaining the divergence or persistence of disparities 
among regions. As a consequence a mere implementation of specific development policy 
designs, although represents the necessary condition for the change, could not resolve the 
catching up process and, therefore, could not allow late regions to leave the 
underdevelopment trap. The sufficient condition is that the policy designs could be added 
with a suitable institutional system.   
In the next section we explain why the unemployment rate may be a better indicator of 
regional labour-market differences. The third section describes the variables chosen to explain 
the functional relationship among the unemployment rate, as the dependent variable, the 
productive structure, and labour-market institutions. Then explained is the methodology used 
to obtain those variables. The last section reports the results of the econometric estimations. 
The conclusions contain some final remarks. 
 
1. The choice for the dependent variable  
As said, studies on economic development and regional convergence regard the employment 
rate as the variable that seems best able to represent labour market conditions. Since the 
Lisbon European Council, the European employment strategy itself has set quantitative 
objectives based on the employment rate. At the same time, an increasing number of studies 
(Marelli 2004 and 2005; Garibaldi and Mauro 2002) have analysed regional disparities on the 
basis of this variable.  
However, there are two main arguments that justify why we choose the unemployment rate as 
the dependent variable. First, there is broad consensus on the contention that institutions – 
implicit or explicit norms and rules, results of agreements between social parts or defined by 
law - mainly affect unemployment. For example, according to the OECD analysis the 
‘Eurosclerosis problem’ of the 90s was due to institutional rigidities in the European labour 
market which generated the growth of the structural unemployment rate: that is, an 
equilibrium rate (NAIRU) to which the labour market converges when, in the absence of 
exogenous shocks, all prices and wages have been completely adjusted (Layard et al. 1991). 
Within this theoretical framework, empirical analysis has sought to demonstrate that the 
different unemployment dynamics of the European countries and, in our opinion, of regions 
depend mainly on micro-level real labour market frictions, such as the wage bargaining power 
of workers and/or of unions, information and incentives at firm-level, job search and matching 
efficiency (Nickell, 1997; Nickell e Layard, 1999; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; for a survey 
see also Caroleo, 2000).  
On the other hand, empirical data show that during the 90s the unemployment rate displayed a 
more marked cyclicity than did the employment rate and that the variability of the 
unemployment rate at regional level was much higher than that of the employment rate. These 
stylized facts suggest that analysis of regional disparities should be better focused on the 
variables that affect the unemployment rate. 
 
2. The independent variables  
Elrhost (2000) lists regional variables connected with the labour market that may generate 
divergence processes among regions. These variables can be summarized as follows: the 
endowment of production factors and ‘fundamentals’; the  structure of local labour markets 
(Genre and Gòmez-Salvador, 2002) in terms of demographic growth, population age-
structure, migration, and commuting (Greenway, Upward and Wright, 2002); the employment   4
level; the productive structure (Marelli, 2003; Paci and Pigliaru, 1999; Paci, Pigliaru and 
Pugno, 2002); demographic density and urbanization (Taylor and Bradley 1997); economic 
and social barriers; human capital; the institutional structure regulating the goods markets and 
the labour market; and the wages composition (Pench, Sestito and Frontini,1999; Hyclack and 
Johnes 1987). 
With no claim to exhaustiveness, in what follows we shall test some of the hypotheses 
outlined above. To this end, we shall estimate the relationship between the unemployment 
rate, measured at the regional level, and a set of variables that may be classified into three 
groups: (a) productive structure and labour market indicators, (b) institutional indicators, and 
(c) variables relative to regional economic performance.  
 
Indicators of the productive structure and labour market 
We began by estimating a proxy for the labour market and productive structures of the 
regions. For this purpose, we calculated two indicators by applying a dynamic multivariate 
factorial analysis. This method is well suited to the study of multidimensional phenomena like 
regional disparities because the regions (cases) can be analysed on the basis of a set of 
indicators (variables) that change over the years (time). 
We decided (Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola 2004) to apply the STATIS (Structuration des 
Tables A Trois Indeces de la Statistique) method (Escoufier 1985 and 1987) (see Appendix). 
This is a dynamic multivariate method able to cluster regions year by year on the basis of a set 
of variables comprising labour market and income indicators, as well as indicators of the 
population structure and the structure of the productive sector. It is thus possible to study how 
the interaction between the labour market structure and economic growth changes over time, 
and also to analyse the dynamics of regions.  
The variables used for this analysis – sometimes based, unfortunately, on relatively crude data 
that bind us to make use of proxy variables when necessary - are listed in Table 1. They were 
taken from the Eurostat REGIO database and the European regions database of Cambridge 
Econometrics Ltd. and they are, as said, indicators characteristic of the labour market and the 
production system (Wishlade and Yuill, 1997). Labour demand was measured by the 
employment rate (TOT), while the labour supply was measured by the labour-force 
participation rate (TAT). The percentage of the long-term unemployed (ULR) was used as a 
proxy for the structural gap between labour demand and supply. The percentage of part-time 
employment (PTT) was used as a measure of the flexibility of the regional labour market. 
The production system was represented by four variables corresponding to the percentages of 
employed persons in agriculture (AGR), industry (IND), traditional services – commerce, 
hotels and non-market services (GHM) – and advanced services – transport, financial services 
and others (IJA). The other variables considered were population density (DEN), as a proxy 
for the agglomeration factors of a region (Fujita M. et al., 2001; Krugman P.R., 1991), and 





Variables used in the STATIS analysis 
N Proxy  Variable  Measure  Acr. 
1 Agglomeration 
factors 
Population density  Inhabitants /sq km  DEN 
2  Labour Supply  total activity rate  labour  force/population  aged 
over 15 
TAT 
3 Labour  demand  employment  rate  employed/population  aged  over 
15 
TOT   5
4 Structural  gap
between Labour
and Supply 





5  Flexibility of the
regional labour
market 
part-time employment rate  part-time  employed/total 
employed 
PTT 
6  percentage employment in
agriculture 
employed in agriculture/ total 
employed 
AGR 
7  percentage employment in 
industry 
employed in industry/total 
employed 
IND 
8  percentage employment in 
traditional services 
employed in retail trade, hotels 







percentage employment in 
advanced services 
employed in transport, 
financial and other 











The European regions (130) selected were disaggregated at a level intended to cover the entire 
territory and to provide the maximum disaggregation possible with the data available. This 
level corresponds to the Nuts 2 level for Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria and Portugal; 
Nuts 1 for Belgium, Germany, Holland, Finland, the United Kingdom; Nuts 0 for Denmark, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden, for which countries there are no Nuts 1 and Nuts 2 
disaggregation. The time period was 1991- 2000. 
The STATIS methodology, as said, consists in the analysis of the three-way matrix (tXij), 
where t denotes the temporal observations, i the regions, and j the variables (i=1,2...I; 
j=1,2...J; t=1,2...T), obtained by the succession of T matrices  j i t X , of the same dimensions. 
The analysis moves through three phases: interstructure, compromise and infrastructure. The 
output from the interstructure phase describes the structure of the T matrices in a vectorial 
space smaller than T. In our case this is reduced to two dimensions but still maintains a good 
similarity to the initial representation. The compromise phase consists in the estimation of a 
synthesis matrix which yields a representation, in the two-dimensional space identified, of the 
characteristic indicators and of the average positions of the regions in the time-span analysed 
(1991-2000). The result of the intrastructure phase is a representation of the trajectories 
followed by the individual regions in the same period of time. 
 
Table 2 
Eigenvalues and inertia percentages of the factorial axes 
Axis  Eigenvalue  Variance explained  Cumulated variance 
explained 
1 3.75547  36.76 36.76 
2 1.99895  19.56 56.32 
3 1.18853  11.63 67.95 
Source: Our calculations on Eurostat REGIO data and on the Cambridge 
Econometrics database 
 
In order to evaluate the goodness of the factorial representation yielded by construction of the 
compromise matrix, Table 2 shows the first three highest eigenvalues and the percentage of 
the total variance explained by the first three factorial axes.   6
To be noted first is that 36.8% of the variance is explained by the first factor, and 19.6% by 
the second, for a total of 56.3% of the variance expressed by the set of all the variables. In 
other words, the first factor alone explains more than one-third of the total variability, while 
the first three factors jointly explain almost 68%. Consequently, the reduction of the 
phenomenon’s variability, obtained by representing it in a two or three dimensional space, is a 
meaningful synthesis of the information considered. 
In order to interpret the two factors, we may refer to Table 3, which shows that minimum and 
maximum period values of the correlations between the variables and the factorial axes. It will 
be seen that the variables most closely correlated with the first factor are, on the one hand, the 
employment rate (TOT), the activity rate (TAT), the percentage of part-time employment 
(PTT), per capita income (PPS), and the percentage of employment in advanced services; and 
on the other (positive quadrant), the percentage of long-term unemployment (ULR), and the 
percentage of employment in agriculture (AGR). In other words, along the first axis one 
observes a clear polarization between the labour market indicators and those relative to the 
production structure. 
Along the second axis one observes a close correlation among, on the one hand, population 
density (DEN), per capita income (PPS), and the percentages of employment in traditional 
services (GHM) and advanced services (IJA), and on the other, the percentage of employment 
in industry (IND) and in agriculture (AGR), and the employment rate (TOT). In this case, we 
may state that the second axis identifies in marked manner only the phenomena representing 
variables located in the positive quadrant, namely those correlated with the territorial 
dimension. In fact, the indicators in this quadrant represent highly urbanized areas, or ones 
which contain rail or road infrastructures or sea ports, or with high levels of tourism. The 
negative quadrant, by contrast, comprises indicators which are more difficult to interpret and 
concern a mix of factors, such as low population density, the presence of agricultural 
employment, and high levels of industry (Amendola, Caroleo, Coppola; 2004).   7
 
Table 3 
Correlations between the variables and the factorial axes (minimum and maximum period values) 
Factor 1  Factor 2  Factor 3 
 Min  Max    Min  Max    Min  Max
TAT  -0.83 -0.75  IND -0.51 -0.47 IND -0.77  -0.71
TOT -0.78 -0.72  TOT  -0.42 -0.37 PPS -0.36  -0.27
PTT -0.76 -0.69  AGR  -0.36 -0.34 ULR  -0.18  0.07
PPS -0.69 -0.63  TAT  -0.34 -0.30 GHM -0.09  -0.04
IJA -0.66 -0.64  PTT  -0.11 -0.03 TOT  0.14  0.25
IND  -0.34 -0.22  IJA 0.27 0.30 IJA 0.14  0.20
DEN -0.30 -0.29  ULR  0.30 0.38 DEN  0.15  0.16
GHM -0.17 -0.07  PPS  0.33 0.36 TAT  0.19  0.32
ULR 0.58 0.64  GHM  0.64 0.73 PTT  0.21  0.33
AGR 0.70 0.72  DEN  0.73 0.73 AGR  0.47  0.49
Source: Our calculations on Eurostat REGIO data and on the Cambridge Econometrics database 
 
In conclusion the European regions seem to lie along the two factorial axes that represent 
certain characteristics of the labour market and the productive structure. The first factor (FF) 
can be interpreted as being a proxy for the ‘bad’ performance of the labour market. It should 
be pointed out that the variable has an opposite sign with respect to the development 
indicator: the regions that achieve a good performance in terms of activity rate and 
employment rate, and higher per capita income levels, have negative values for this factor. By 
contrast, those regions that have high long-term unemployment rates and high percentages of 
employed in agriculture have positive values.  
The second factor (SF)  may be interpreted as a factor that is positive correlated with 
urbanization and a highly developed tertiary sector. 
 
Institutional Variables 
If the first factor obtained by STATIS can be interpreted as the labour market’s level of 
efficiency and flexibility, further indicators of the rigidity/flexibility of the labour market are 
the degree of decentralization of its regulatory institutions and, particularly, the level of wage 
bargaining centralization  (Calmfors, 1993; Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). 
For the purposes of our analysis, the best proxy for the institutional decentralization of the 
labour market would have been not only a variable related to the level of decentralized 
bargaining but also the extent to which the industrial relations system is regionally organized. 
Industrial relations concern the system of employment protection which provides security 
against (i) the risk of future unemployment and job precariousness, (ii) barriers to human 
capital development, (iii) restriction of the right to work, and (iv) obstacles to worker 
representation. These components of the industrial relations system should be adjusted 
according to the characteristics of local labour markets. Furthermore, active labour market 
policies, even if centrally determined, in a number of European countries are aimed at 
implementing arrangements appropriate to particular local labour market characteristics and 
also involving several local actors and local procedures.  
Unfortunately, homogeneous data at the European level were not available. We could 
consequently only use the standard indicator of bargaining centralization (CENTR), which 
combines the levels of wage bargaining centralization and of wage coordination among the 
most important trade unions (Checchi and Lucifora 2002; Boeri, Brugiavini and Calmfors 
2002). The underlying hypothesis was that the more the bargaining on wages takes place at 
the level of the individual firm, the more account must be taken of that firm’s productivity 
level, given that it is necessarily affected by the local economic conditions.   8
A further institutional aspect considered in our analysis was the administrative 
decentralization of the public administration. We chose two indicators for this aspect: the first 
was the degree of centralization of public expenditure (CFG) (source IMF 2003); the second 
is an index of bureaucracy (BUREAUCRACY) (see: www.countrydata.com). The former is 
calculated as the ratio between expenditure by the central administration and total public 
expenditure. The lower this ratio, the higher will be the percentage of expenditure by the local 
administration. This ratio represents, in our opinion, a good proxy of the decentralization of 
public expenditure powers to the regional level. The index of bureaucracy is disaggregated at 
national level and can be considered a proxy of the public administration’s efficiency. 
 
Variables for the economic performances of regions 
The third group of variables comprised two widely-used regional development indexes: the 
percentage variation of the Gross Value Added at constant price (GRPR) and per capita 




List of the independent Variables 
Acronym Variables 
CONS   Constant 
FF  Index factor of the labour market’s performance 
(the variable has an opposite sign related to development’s index) 
SF  Index factor of tertiary/urbanization 
CENTR   bargaining centralization index 
CGF  level of public expenditure centralization 
BUREAUCRACY Bureaucracy  index 




3. The Estimation Method: The Panel Data analysis  
 
Our dataset was a Panel where the cases were regions and the time units were the years from 
1991 to 2000. We accordingly used panel data econometric methods in order to study the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and the set of independent variables.  
The model may be written as 
it it it z x y ε α β α + + + =
' '
0  [1] 
where  n i ,....... 1 = ,  T t . ,......... 1 = .   0 a is the constant, β  is the vector of coefficients,  it x  
contains K regressors and the matrix  it z , is a set of non-observable variables that captures the 
specific effects due to the characteristics of the individuals, which in our study were 109 
European regions -twenty-one regions were excluded from the econometric analysis because 
the CENTR variable was not available form them, it ε  is the error term.  
The variables in  it z  are not observed and may be correlated or not correlated with the 
regressors. In the former case, in model [1] the intercept is group specific and is constant over 
time. This is the Fixed Effects model and may be written as:  
it i it it x a y ε α β + + + =
'
0    [2] 
In the latter case, the model is defined as a Random Effects model. The variables of the matrix 
it z  are unobservable and uncorrelated with the  it x . In this case the model becomes    9
it i it it u x y ε β α + + + =
'
0  [3] 
where  i u  is the group-specific stochastic term.   
The difference between the fixed effect and the random effect model resides in the nature of 
the individual component  i α  (in the fixed model)  and  i u  in the random model. In the fixed 
effects model,  i α  is deterministic and captures the individual’s characteristics. It assumes 
different values for each single individual; it is constant over time; and because it is related to 
the characteristics of the individual, it is correlated with the variables  i x . In the Random 
Effects model, the term  i u  has a group specific random distribution. The term  i u  is a 
stochastic variable and is not correlated with the i x  because these variables are not stochastic. 
The Fixed Effect model is useful for territorial – inter-country or inter-regional – 
comparisons, as in our case, because it can be plausibly supposed that the non-observed 
characteristics captured by the variables are constant over time (Green, 2003). However, it is 
possible  to determine which is the better specification – fixed effect or random effect – by 
using the Hausmann test. 
The model estimated is as follows: 
it i it it it
it it it it it it
CGF CGF CENTR
Y BUREAUCRAC INVPOP GDPR SF FF a UNRATE
ε ν β β β
β β β β β
+ + + + +
+ + + + + + =
2                  8 7 6
5 4 3 2 1  
where  ais the constant,  8 1......β β  are the parameters,  i υ  is the individual component and it ε  
the error term. The acronyms of the variables are reported in the above list. The variable that 
measures the level of public expenditure centralization (CFG) is also considered in its 
quadratic form (CFG2) in order to test the hypothesis of a quadratic relationship of this 
variable with the unemployment rate and, consequently, the existence of an optimal 
dimension in the degree of centralization of public expenditure.  
 
Results 
Table 5 sets out the results. Reported in the third and fourth columns are respectively the 
Random Effects and the Fixed Effects estimates. For the sake of completeness, this table also 
includes the OLS estimation (column 1), and the Random effect model is obtained by using 
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (columns 1).  
The signs of the coefficients obtained with the four estimation methods are always the same. 
The Hausmann test rejects the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between the 
dependent variables and the error terms. This is the fundamental hypothesis of the random 
effects model, and because it is rejected, we may conclude that the Fixed Effect model is the 
well-specified model.  
The result confirms the theoretical hypotheses formulated in the previous sections. In 
particular, the coefficients in the Fixed Effect Model are all statistically significant and they 
have the expected sign. Only the variable GDPR – the annual growth rate of gross value 
added per capita – is significant only at the 8% level. 
The dependent variables are expressed in different measures. Accordingly, in order to 
compare the magnitude of their effects on the unemployment rate, we calculated the standard 
coefficients of the variables and the elasticity to their mean value (tab. 6).
  
 
Summary and conclusions 
The results obtained seem to confirm our initial hypothesis: namely that the unemployment 
rate is correlated with the extent to which wage bargaining is decentralized, with the 
institutional efficiency of regions, and also with the bureaucracy level, although the impact of 
this last variable on the unemployment rate is small.     10
The centralization level of the public expenditure has a quadratic relationship with the 
unemployment rate. This means that the unemployment level grows together with the degree 
to which public expenditure is centralized, but in a less than proportional way, until the value 
of the centralization ratio is equal to 75%. Above that value unemployment decreases. 
Nevertheless, we should be cautious in interpreting this result because the signs of the 
variables CGF and CFG2 are the opposite in the OLS Method.      
Also the economic performances of regions – measured by GDP growth and investment per 
capita (INVPOP) – have negative impacts on unemployment rates. The latter variable has a 
standard coefficient which is double that of the former. 
Also interesting are the values of the two structural factors coefficients. As to be expected, the 
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with the good performance of the regional labour 
market (high activity and employment rate, high share of employment in the industrial and 
advanced services sectors) measured by the first factor (FF).  
It is more difficult to explain the positive relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
second factor, which relates to the large share of services and high demographic density. In 
this case the results seem to confirm the empirical evidence – as also reported in the third 
Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the EU – that “cities act as centres of 
employment for a widely-drawn population, with one in every three jobs being taken by 
someone commuting into the city” (Commission of the European Communities, Third 
Progress Report on Cohesion, page 22). For this reason, unemployment and social problems 
in the European Union are more severe in urban centres, as well as in regard to the 




Results of the Panel Data Estimation Dependent Variable: Unemployment rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  OLS  MLE  Random Effects  Fixed Effects 
 coefficient  P-level  coefficient  P-level  coefficient P-level  coefficient  P-level 
CONS 10.763 0.01 -16.871 0.00 -12.303 0.00 -24.931 0.00 
FF 2.233 0.00 1.706 0.00 1.849 0.00 1.183 0.00 
SF 1.388 0.00 1.784 0.00 1.578 0.00 2.633 0.00 
GDPR 0.181 0.00 -0.046 0.02 -0.044 0.04 -0.037 0.08 
INVPOP -0.002 0.01 -0.002 0.00 -0.002 0.00 -0.001 0.00 
BUREAUCRACY 2.646 0.00 1.855 0.00 2.064 0.00 1.558 0.00 
CENTR -0.083 0.00 0.047 0.00 0.029 0.01 0.077 0.00 
CGF -0.179 0.02 0.528 0.00 0.402 0.00 0.753 0.00 
CFG2 0.001 0.13 -0.004 0.00 -0.003 0.00 -0.005 0.00 
                
Num.  obs.  1090   1090   1090   1090  
Num. groups      109   109   109  
R2 0.5777              
R2corr 0.5746              
F(8,1081) 184.87 0.00            
Log likelihood      -2399.9584          
LR chi2(8)      378.58 0.00        
R-sq within          0.2704   0.2929  
R-sq between          0.4689   0.2909  
R-sq overall          0.4466   0.2861  
Random effect u_i                 
Corr(u_i,X)         0   -0.392700  
Sigma u          3.1659   5.289283  
Sigma e          1.7714   1.771356  
Rho (% of the variance due to u)          0.7616   0.899155  
Wald chi2(8)          479.46      
F(8,973)             50.39 0.000 
Hausmann Test  (Ho : corr (ui, X)=0) 
CHI2 (  8); Prob>CHI2            113.92 0.000   12
 
Table 6 
Mean, Standard deviation (s.d), 
parameters (fixed effect), standard coefficients (s.c.), elasticity  at mean value (el.) 
Variable Mean  s.d  .    parameter s.  c.  El. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE   10.885 6.064       
CONSTANT     -24.931  
FF -0.300 1.766 1.183 0.344  -0.033
SF 0.171 1.384 2.633 0.601  0.041
GDPR 2.029 3.260 -0.037 -0.020  -0.007
INVPOP 50.239 178.694 -0.001 -0.044  -0.007
BUREAUCRACY 3.974 0.143 1.558 0.037  0.569
CENTR 25.747 16.247 0.077 0.207  0.183
CGF 73.082 8.256 0.753
CGF2 5409.132 991.429 -0.005
 
0.199  0.289
   13
APPENDIX 
 
STATIS is a method  based on study of a three-way data matrix  JT I X , obtained from the 
temporal succession of data matrices  j i t X ,  of the same order, where i is the statistical unit and 
j the variable, both of them relative to the period t (i = 1, 2...I; j = 1, 2...J; t=1, 2...T). The 
formula is: 
 
X X X T JT I 2 1 , = Χ
 
 
From the three-way matrix thus constructed it is possible to derive: 
1) the variance-covariance matrix 
pq Σ  that is the variance-covariance matrix between pXi,j  
and  qXi,j :  
The matrices on the main diagonal represent the variance-covariance matrices of the matrix 
JT I, Χ  at time t, while 
pqΣ
 measures the same relation between the variables relative to time q 
and time j. 
 2) the (TxT) square matrix, ITT ,  where each generic element 
It r pq p q , () = Σ   corresponds to the 
trace of the relative submatrix 
pq Σ  of ΣJT JT ,  and it is a measure of the dissimilarity between 
pXi,j /and qXi,j.  
The STATIS method divides into three phases:  Interstructure, Compromise and 
Intrastructure. 
The purpose of the Interstructure phase is to identify a suitable vectorial space smaller than T, 
where the T occasions can be represented. 
To this end, examination is made of the matrix ITT ,  (the interstructure matrix), the column 
vectors of which are assumed as characteristic elements of each of the T occasions. 
Constructed from this is a factorial subspace ℜ
s
 with s < t generated by the s eigenvectors 
corresponding to the s largest eigenvalues of ITT , . The subspace thus constructed yields the 
best representation of the T occasions because it is demonstrated that the matrix Q, of rank 
T s <  – whose elements 







1  are linear combinations of the first δa eigenvalues 
and ua eigenvectors of the matrix ITT ,  - has the characteristic of minimizing the square of the 
Euclidean norm || I-Q ||
2. 
A first result is thus obtained. The T occasions with coordinates equal to  1 1u δ , 
2 2u δ ,.......... h hu δ  can be generated in the factorial subspace ℜ
s
 by the first eigenvectors 
u a . 
In the compromise phase, a fictitious structure or synthesis matrix is identified which 
optimally summarizes the information contained in the T variance and covariance matrices. 
This structure, called ‘compromise’, is given by the matrix W obtained as a linear 
combination of the elements u1 of the eigenvector of the matrix ITT ,  corresponding to the 







t t u W
1    14
 
In the space plotted by the s eigenvectors corresponding to the first s eigenvalues of the 
matrix W it is possible to represent both the j variables and the median positions of each 
individual. The latter are derived from the diagonalization of matrix W obtained by 
identifying a matrix M such that W = MMD (where D is a diagonal matrix defined positive 






, with L equal to 
the number of individuals, and where I is an identity matrix.  
In other words, matrix W is the best compromise, in the sense defined above, among the 
various representations that can be associated with each of the T matrices taken separately for 
each unit of time. 
In the intrastructure phase it is then possible to represent the trajectories followed in time by 
each individual in the factorial space thus identified. If only the first two eigenvalues are 
considered, the representation of the trajectories may occur in a space where the system of 
Cartesian axes is constituted by the eigenvectors  1 a a1 and  2 a a2, and where the coordinates 
on the first axis of each individual are given by ( )
5 . 0
1 1




− Γa t δ  .   15
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